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“One of the Web’s ‘dirty little secrets’ is that, in many cases, top search engine results are
available to those willing to pay the price.”1
The “dirty little secret” mentioned above is known as “keying”2 and has been
considered a form of web abuse by some scholars.3  Keying is a practice in which
search engines sell terms (i.e., keywords) to advertisers that an Internet user is
likely to type into a search box to trigger the advertiser’s website to appear in the
user’s search results.4  Search engines generate revenue from selling keywords.5
In particular, Google, the leading search engine in the world, has seen an increase
in profits which can be attributed to a surge in revenue from keying advertise-
ments.6  Although keying is not prohibited by a specific law, courts across the
country have been called upon to determine if this practice constitutes trademark
infringement.7
In Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., the Northern District of New York
was presented with the question of whether a search engine’s sale of a company’s
trademark as a keyword for advertising purposes satisfied the “use” requirement
for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act.8  The court analyzed the
“use” requirement as a threshold matter in determining trademark infringe-
ment.9  This analysis has typically required that a plaintiff satisfy the “use” re-
quirement by demonstrating physical affixation of the trademark to goods or
services before a court will consider the other elements of infringement.10  The
court granted Google’s motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff failed to es-
tablish the “use” requirement because Google did not physically affix its mark to
any goods or services.11  In today’s world, where many companies do business
online, this narrow interpretation of the “use” requirement is problematic because
it will lead to a weakening of trademark protection for these companies.  This
1. Neal S. Greenfield, Searching Trademarks and Domain Names, in TRADEMARK LAW & THE IN-
TERNET: ISSUES, CASE LAW, AND PRACTICE TIPS 63, 90 (Lisa E. Cristal & Neal S. Greenfield eds., 2d
ed. 2001).
2. See  Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1022 (9th Cir. 2004).
3. See Greenfield, supra note 1, at 90–91; see also Lisa E. Cristal, Web Abuse, in TRADEMARK LAW &
THE INTERNET: ISSUES, CASE LAW, AND PRACTICE TIPS 331 (Lisa E. Cristal & Neal S. Greenfield eds.,
2d ed. 2001).
4. Rita A. Abbati & G. Peter Albert, Jr., Metatags, Keywords, and Links: Recent Developments Ad-
dressing Trademark Threats in Cyberspace, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 341, 358 (2003).
5. Cristal, supra note 3, at 359.
6. Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92
IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=927996 (at 6–7); see also Search
Ads Fire up Google’s Profits, BBC NEWS, Apr. 21, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4470747.
stm.
7. See generally Cristal, supra note 3, at 359–361.
8. 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 395–96 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).
9. Id . at 400.
10. Id .
11. Id . at 404.
138
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\52-1\NLR101.txt unknown Seq: 5 19-NOV-07 15:44
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 52  2007/08
case comment contends that the court should have denied Google’s motion to dis-
miss because the “use” requirement should be interpreted more broadly to protect
trademark rights on the Internet.
Plaintiff Rescuecom Corporation is a business that specializes in computer
services franchising.12  It owns sixty-seven franchises that offer services like com-
puter repair, networking, and Internet services.13  In 1998, Rescuecom registered
the trademark “Rescuecom” in the United States and allowed its franchisees to use
its trademark.14  Over the years, plaintiff alleged the corporation has gained a
reputation for superior computer services and excellent customer service, making
its trademark a “valuable business asset.”15  Rescuecom obtains a large percentage
of its business from potential franchisees and customers by using the domain
name “Rescuecom.com.”16
Defendant Google is an Internet search engine that retrieves thousands of
search results that correspond to an Internet user’s specific search terms.17  Using
those search terms, Google is able to identify the interests of the Internet user and
sell “contextual advertising space” to other companies.18  These companies can
then insert advertisements and links to their own websites adjacent to users’
search results.19  Google obtains a substantial profit from this type of
advertising.20
Google offers two contextual advertising services: AdWords and the
Keyword Suggestion Tool.21  AdWords is a program that allows advertisers to
buy keywords that an Internet user is likely to enter as search terms.22  On the
same webpage with the user’s search results, Google will also post the advertiser’s
sponsored hyperlink.23  Sponsored links appear immediately above or to the right
12. Id . at 396.  The court accepted the facts of this case as true from Rescuecom’s complaint. Id .
13. Id .
14. Id .
15. Id .
16. Id .
17. Id .
18. Id. at 396–97.
19. Id . at 397.
20. Id . at 396.  Users of the AdWords program must pay a five dollar activation fee.  The minimum cost-per-
click rate (when an Internet user clicks on your sponsored link) is one cent, but this rate depends on
keyword quality, the location of the advertiser, and currency settings.  The minimum cost-per-thousand
impressions is twenty-five cents, which again depends on the location of the advertiser and currency
settings. See  https://adwords.google.com/select/AfpoFinder?countryCode=US (last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
21. Rescuecom , 456 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
22. Id .; see  Google AdWords Learning Center, http://www.google.com/adwords/learningcenter/text/18719.
html#ctx=tltp (last visited Sept. 6, 2007) (describing how quality is the most significant factor used to
determine the price that an advertiser using AdWords will pay when an Internet user clicks on his ad).
23. Rescuecom , 456 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
139
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\52-1\NLR101.txt unknown Seq: 6 19-NOV-07 15:44
RESCUECOM CORP. v. GOOGLE, INC.
of the search results for the keyword entered in Google’s search box.24  According
to Rescuecom, Google’s sponsored links are not always identified as such and are
designed to look like other (non-sponsored) search results.25  Consequently, In-
ternet users may believe that the sponsored links are the most relevant links
among the results.26  Contextual advertisers pay Google based on the amount of
clicks that a sponsored link receives.27  Rescuecom and many of its competitors
have bought the Rescuecom trademark as a keyword in the AdWords program.28
The Keyword Suggestion Tool offers keywords that Google indicates will direct
traffic to advertisers’ websites.29  Through the Keyword Suggestion Tool, Google
has recommended to Rescuecom’s competitors the use of “Rescuecom” as a
keyword.30
Rescuecom filed a federal trademark claim against Google seeking redress for
Google’s use of the Rescuecom trademark in its contextual advertising practices.31
Rescuecom argued that Google used its trademark by selling it to competitors.32
Rescuecom claimed that Google was (1) free-riding on its good reputation, (2)
creating consumer confusion with respect to the presence of sponsored links on
search result pages, (3) luring Internet users away from Rescuecom’s website, (4)
using the Rescuecom trademark as a keyword to trigger sponsored links, and (5)
altering the search results that appeared to Internet users.33  Google moved to
dismiss the complaint, arguing that under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et
seq. , its sale of Rescuecom’s trademark did not constitute a trademark “use.”34
The Northern District of New York granted Google’s motion to dismiss
Rescuecom’s claims.35  The court relied on 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v.
24. Id .
25. Id .
26. Id .
27. Id .
28. Id .
29. Id .
30. Id .  For example, the Keyword Suggestion Tool offered by Google could be used by a handbag designer
who wants to make the advertising for his handbags more successful.  This seller will type in “handbags,”
and then Google will generate a list of potential keywords to purchase, which includes keywords like
“Prada handbags,” a popular handbag brand.  If the seller purchases this keyword, then the sponsored link
for his website will appear at the top of the search results page for “Prada handbags.”  To see the whole list
of suggested keywords, visit https://adwords.google.com/select/KeywordToolExternal?defaultView=3 (last
visited Sept. 6, 2007) and type in “handbags” as the initial keyword.
31. Rescuecom , 456 F. Supp. 2d at 395. For the purposes of this case comment, the other claims of false
designation of origin, federal dilution of trademark, common law trademark infringement, and state law
dilution of trademark brought by Rescuecom will not be addressed. See id. at 395–96.
32. Id . at 400.
33. Id .
34. Id . at 395.
35. Id . at 404.
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WhenU.com, Inc., a Second Circuit case that analyzed the “use” requirement
for a trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act.36  In 1-800 Con-
tacts, Inc., the court held that in order to assert a valid trademark claim a
plaintiff must establish that:37
(1) [the plaintiff] has a valid mark that is entitled to protection
under the Lanham Act; and that (2) the defendant used the mark, (3)
in commerce, (4) “in connection with the sale . . . or advertising of
goods and services,” (5) without the plaintiff’s consent.  In addition, the
plaintiff must show that defendant’s use of that mark is “likely to cause
confusion . . . as to the affiliation, connection, or association of [defen-
dant] with [plaintiff], or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of
[the defendant’s] goods, services, or commercial activities by
[plaintiff].”38
The court held that the “use” element must be established before considering any
additional elements of the claim.39  If a plaintiff cannot establish that defendant
“used” its mark, then its trademark claim must fail, even if plaintiff satisfied the
other four elements.40  Following the test set forth in 1-800 Contacts, Inc., the
Rescuecom court held that Rescuecom’s infringement claim could not survive
Google’s motion to dismiss because Rescuecom failed to provide sufficient evidence
that Google “used” its trademark.41  The court reasoned that Google neither af-
fixed Rescuecom’s trademark on any goods or services, nor in any way indicated
that Rescuecom was the source of any goods or services.42
The court correctly analyzed Rescuecom’s claim by focusing on “use” as a
threshold matter, but its analysis was flawed.  By interpreting “use” to mean
physical affixation of a trademark on goods or services, the court disregarded the
fact that the Internet makes it possible for one company to use another company’s
trademark to show source or sponsorship without physical affixation.43  The “use”
requirement should have been construed more broadly to protect trademark own-
ers and to prevent consumer confusion and free-riding on the Internet.
36. Id . at 399–400.
37. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 406–07 (2d Cir. 2005).
38. Id . (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000)) (citations omitted).
39. Rescuecom , 456 F. Supp. 2d at 399–400 (citing 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 406–07 for the other
elements of a trademark infringement claim that should be determined after the “use” element is satisfied,
namely the “in commerce” and “likelihood of confusion” requirements).
40. Id . at 401.
41. Id . at 403. Trademark use is equivalent to placing “plaintiff’s trademark on any goods, displays, contain-
ers, or advertisements, or [using] plaintiff’s trademark in any way that indicates source or origin . . . .”
Id .
42. Id .
43. Id .
141
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In 1-800 Contacts, Inc., the Second Circuit stressed the importance of the
“use” requirement in an infringement claim, noting that without “use” no activ-
ity on the part of a defendant is actionable.44  Treating “use” as a threshold mat-
ter in analyzing a trademark infringement claim is also known as the
“trademark use” theory and has received some criticism from scholars who believe
that this theory will lead to inadequate marketplace regulation on the Internet.45
However, requiring a plaintiff to establish “use” as a threshold matter has gained
strength from the underlying principles and economics of trademark law, as well
as statutory language in the Lanham Act.
Historically, trademark law has been based on the concepts of use and associ-
ation.46  A symbol gains trademark protection only if it is associated with a good
or service in a way that is recognizable by consumers.47  This idea, known as
“commercial magnetism,” is the underlying principle of trademark law and dis-
tinguishes trademarks from other intellectual property rights.48  Trademark law
does not grant a trademark owner a property right in a specific symbol to desig-
nate his goods or services.49  Nor does a trademark owner have a monopoly over
the use of that symbol because protection is premised on use, not adoption of a
symbol.50  For example, the fair use doctrine may be used to protect another user
of the same mark where there is no confusion as to the source of the goods or
services.51
44. Id .
45. See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 6, at 2, 6.  This criticism has come from scholars that favor taking a
“contextualist approach” to an infringement claim. Id . at 95–97.  The contextualist approach examines all
the elements necessary for trademark infringement simultaneously instead of requiring a finding of “use”
before the infringement analysis of the other elements can proceed. Id .  These scholars claim that “trade-
mark use” theorists put too much emphasis on “use” which historically has been of much greater importance
in trademark registration than in the case of infringement. Id . at 19. They believe that the “trademark
use” theory is flawed because there is no statutory language in the Lanham Act supporting it, and the
theory disregards the purpose of infringement, which is to provide a remedy for the creation of existing
consumer confusion. Id . at 6, 18.
46. Uli Widmaier, Use, Liability, and the Structure of Trademark Law, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603, 612
(2004).
47. Id . at 605.
48. Id . at 606.  The importance of “commercial magnetism” for trademark protection is demonstrated by the
following logical sequence: “without use of a symbol, consumers cannot perceive [a good or service]; with-
out consumer perception, the symbol cannot exert whatever commercial magnetism it may have over
consumers; without commercial magnetism, the symbol does not function as a trademark.” Id .
49. Id . at 616–17.  The author also notes that other forms of intellectual property rights, like copyright and
patent, are property rights in gross. Id . at 618.
50. Id . at 617.
51. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 811–12
(4th ed., 2006) (discussing trademark uses that are not actionable because they do not attempt to profit
from consumer confusion or use the trademark of one product on another product to indicate source).
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Statutory language within the Lanham Act also supports requiring a plain-
tiff to demonstrate “use” as a threshold matter.  Under the Lanham Act, a mark is
“used in commerce”:
(1) on goods when—
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or
the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto,
or if the nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then
on documents associated with the goods or their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of
services and the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are
rendered in more than one State or in the United States and a foreign
country and the person rendering the services is engaged in commerce
in connection with the services.52
The term “use in commerce” is found in both the registration and infringement
sections of the Lanham Act.53  Furthermore, the General Provisions Section of
the Lanham Act makes clear that the purpose of the act is to regulate commerce by
providing a cause of action for deceptive “uses of a mark.”54  An alleged in-
fringer’s use of a trademarked term is only actionable when it meets the standard
for trademark protection established by 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).55  It is evi-
dent from the construction of the Lanham Act that a trademark infringement
claim cannot proceed if a defendant has not affixed its trademark to goods or
services.
Furthermore, the economic purposes behind the Lanham Act also support
treating “use” as a threshold issue in determining whether a plaintiff has stated a
claim for trademark infringement.  Professor William Landes and the Honorable
Richard Posner have asserted that trademark law is grounded in economic prin-
ciples in a manner that is not as evident in other forms of intellectual property.56
Unlike copyright law, for example, Landes and Posner stress that trademarks
provide useful information to consumers in an economically efficient manner.57
They note that fanciful trademarks like “Exxon” are devoid of meaning unless
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1114 (2000).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
55. Widmaier, supra note 46, at 624.
56. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 166 (2003).
57. See id. at 172.  Protection in the form of copyrights and patents is also based on non-economic property
theories, like the natural rights and personhood theories. See Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copy-
rights Morally Justified?  The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 817, 818–23 (1990).  The natural rights theory proposes that man is entitled to the fruits of
his labor because he has removed something from nature and created something new that is worthy of
protection. Id.  Furthermore, the personhood theory proposes that property rights in an object or idea are
143
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they are associated with a specific product.58  Protection is only granted for that
association, and it logically follows that infringement occurs only if a consumer is
misled into associating the “Exxon” mark with another product.  By associating a
specific symbol with a product or service, the cost of searching for the product is
lowered.59  A trademark is not a good; it only has value when associated with a
particular brand of products or services.60  If that mark is then appropriated by
an infringer and placed on another brand of products, the information embodied
in the association between the trademark and the original brand is destroyed.61
This causes consumer confusion in the marketplace, leading to the loss of time and
money that the trademark owner invested in his brand, and adversely increases
consumer search costs.62  The law must protect trademark owners from free-rid-
ers who can duplicate a competitor’s trademark at little expense, but cause con-
sumer confusion and increased search costs.63
After considering  the underlying principles of trademark law, the statutory
construction of the Lanham Act, and the economics of trademark protection, the
requirement that “use” be shown before proving the other elements of infringe-
ment is an integral part of trademark infringement analysis.  Yet, how can this
test be reconciled with the manner in which trademarks are “used” on the In-
ternet?  Does the Internet require a broader interpretation of the “use” require-
ment as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1127 for purposes of analyzing a trademark
infringement claim?
The “use” requirement found in 15 U.S.C. § 1127 was enacted before the
Internet boom and therefore was concerned only with physical affixation of the
mark on goods, documents related to goods, and uses in connection with the sale or
advertising of services.64  However, with the birth of the Internet, keying can be
used to create similar associations between trademarks and other products and
services without physical branding as in the off-line world.65  A search engine
like Google makes associations for Internet users when it links a trademarked
keyword to the sponsored websites of competitors.  In this case, the court acknowl-
edged Rescuecom’s assertion that sponsored links often look like the other results
on the page and that Internet users may imply from their appearance that they
necessary for the development of personality because man’s personality is shaped by his interaction with
property. Id.
58. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 56, at 172.
59. Id . at 168.
60. Id . at 172.
61. Id . at 168.
62. See id.
63. Id .
64. See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 6, at 19.
65. See id. at 19–20.
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are the most relevant sites among the results.66  Rescuecom argued that, as a
consequence, Google’s keying practices created consumer confusion by suggesting
to Internet users that the sponsored links are associated with Rescuecom.67  A
search engine’s internal use of a trademark is not only a revenue-generating
practice, but also a system of making associations between trademarks and the
products and services offered by related competitors whose websites appear in the
search results.  This form of association satisfies the “use” requirement under the
Lanham Act.
Search engines like Google are not passive providers of information.68  They
can be thought of as intermediary association makers.  Search engines control a
searcher’s experiences by making editorial decisions about the websites included in
their databases, and then using relevancy algorithms to sort search results.69  A
relevancy algorithm is a method used by search engines to determine the order
and relevance of search results.70  In essence, the keying practice functions as a
relevancy algorithm because a publisher’s position on the search results page is
determined by how much he is willing to pay for placement.71  Through this
algorithm, search engines assign a different meaning to a searcher’s keywords.72
Consequently, the information capital built up in a trademark becomes distorted
because a search engine associates one company’s trademark with a different
product or service.
Associative uses of a trademark usually do not constitute infringement be-
cause a junior user is referring to a senior user’s trademarked product to commu-
nicate some point about the junior user’s product.73  This is permitted for
comparative advertising reasons.  Comparative advertising fosters competition
among similar businesses and helps consumers by ultimately giving them more
choices.74  However, when comparative advertising is used as a disguise for de-
ceptive trade practices, a problem arises.  For example, the message being con-
veyed by a junior user may not communicate something about his product, but
rather communicates that the senior user’s product is the source of his product.75
This confusion can occur very easily on the Internet because sponsored links are
minimally descriptive and often advertise similar products or services.  With key-
66. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 397 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).
67. Id . at 400.
68. Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 532 (2005).
69. Id . at 533–34.
70. Id . at 534.
71. Id .
72. Id . at 538.
73. Id . at 556.
74. Id . at 557.
75. Id . at 556.
145
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ing, the competitors of a trademarked product are using a trademark, not to con-
vey something about their product, but rather to mislead Internet users into
thinking that their product is sponsored by the trademark owner or has some
association with that trademark.  The court in Rescuecom  even acknowledged
that sponsored links on Google’s search results page are deceiving, and that In-
ternet users can infer that those links are the most relevant to their search
terms.76  The trademark system protects against improper uses like this because
they create consumer confusion, with a junior user trying to take advantage of
the goodwill associated with the senior user.77
As mentioned above, Google’s keying practice is a relevancy algorithm that
filters content based on the amount of money paid rather than the accuracy of the
search results.78  This false filtering can lead to consumer confusion and increased
search costs because Internet users may incorrectly think that the sponsored links
they receive from Google are from the senior user.79  Searchers will then pursue
the suggested sponsored link.  As a result, a company’s competitors can make
searchers continue to browse their websites without ever clarifying the searchers’
false expectations.80  Some searchers will even go so far as to purchase the product
or service offered by the competitors because they have no reason to believe that
the product they are purchasing is not associated with the trademarked company,
especially in situations where competitors offer very similar products or
services.81
The use of a trademark in this manner is actionable because the junior user
is trying to take advantage of the goodwill associated with the senior user.82
Goodwill embodies all the positive feelings that a consumer has built up towards
a trademarked product, which may encourage future transactions with the owner
of that trademark.83  For example, the goodwill of the Rescuecom trademark re-
76. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 397 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).
77. Goldman, supra note 68, at 556–58.
78. See id. at 534.
79. Id . at 578.
80. Id .
81. One question to consider is why the word “sponsored” is used to describe these links.  Who sponsors them?
Of course Google and Internet advertisers know why these websites are referred to as “sponsored links,”
but it is questionable whether the average Internet user knows the meaning of a sponsored link.  The Pew
Internet & American Life Project polled 2,200 adult Internet users and of those 2,200 searchers only about
one out of six said that he could consistently distinguish between search results that were paid for (spon-
sored) and those that were not. See DEBORAH FALLOWS, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT,
SEARCH ENGINE USERS 18 (2005), http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Searchengine_users.pdf.  An
alarming 62 percent of searchers were unaware of the difference between paid (sponsored) and unpaid
search results. Id .
82. Goldman, supra note 68, at 558.
83. Id .
146
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fers to the reputation that it built up for providing excellent computer services.84
Misappropriation occurs when the goodwill associated with the senior user,
Rescuecom, is transferred to junior users, Rescuecom’s competitors, and the junior
users benefit from this conveyance.  This is also known as free-riding.85  In fact,
Google even recommended to Rescuecom’s competitors that they buy the
Rescuecom trademark as a keyword to capitalize on Rescuecom’s reputable
business.86
Other courts have begun to acknowledge that non-physical uses of a trade-
mark on the Internet are sufficient to satisfy the “use” requirement for trademark
infringement.  In GEICO v. Google, Inc., the Eastern District of Virginia
denied Google’s motion to dismiss a trademark infringement claim because GE-
ICO sufficiently alleged that Google used the GEICO trademark in commerce.87
The court noted that when Google sells the right to link advertising to GEICO’s
trademark, Google is using the GEICO trademark in commerce and in such a
way that it may imply that Google has permission from GEICO to do so.88  In
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendant after
finding that Netscape’s use of the Playboy trademark in its keying practices was
undisputed.89  The court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed in
relation to the likelihood of confusion created by Netscape’s use of the trademark
because Playboy presented sufficient evidence of actual confusion.90
Similarly, in Google, Inc. v. American Blind & Wallpaper Factory,
Inc. , the Northern District of California followed the infringement analysis used
in Playboy which held that the other elements of trademark infringement should
only be addressed once trademark use is found.91  American Blind, like
Rescuecom, built up an excellent reputation for its services and conducted a sig-
nificant percentage of its business through its website.92  Google sold keywords to
American Blind’s competitors that were very similar to American Blind’s regis-
tered trademarks.93  The court denied Google’s motion to dismiss the trademark
84. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 396 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).
85. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 56, at 168.
86. Rescuecom , 456 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
87. 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703–04 (E.D. Va. 2004). But see Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting,
Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415–16 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that the defendants’ purchases of the Zocor
trademark from search engines for keying purposes did not constitute use of the mark). This case is distin-
guishable from our case because here the defendants were not search engines, but rather three online
pharmacies who actually sold Zocor manufactured by affiliates of Merck. See id. at 407.
88. GEICO , 330 F. Supp. 2d at 704.
89. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2004).
90. Id . at 1026–27.
91. No. C03-5340JF, 2005 WL 832398 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005).
92. Id . at *1.
93. Id . at *2.
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infringement claim relating to its keying practices because American Blind sub-
mitted sufficient evidence of the possibility of trademark use by Google.94
Since the Internet has become a significant source of information for society
as well as a strategic tool for business and advertising purposes, protecting trade-
mark use online has become increasingly important.  Trademark protection
should extend to keying practices on the Internet because companies are improp-
erly using other companies’ registered trademarks, enabling them to free-ride on
the goodwill associated with these trademarks and creating consumer confusion.
Although the Northern District of New York correctly analyzed the “use” require-
ment, it should not have granted Google’s motion to dismiss because Rescuecom
submitted sufficient evidence to raise an issue of material fact as to whether
Google’s keying practice used Rescuecom’s trademark in commerce.  By narrowly
interpreting the scope of trademark use, the court frustrated the goals of trade-
mark protection  and the Internet, both of which aim to provide society with
accurate and useful information.  A broader interpretation of “use,” that extends
beyond physical branding of the trademark on products or services, is necessary to
ensure that trademarks are afforded the same measure of protection on the In-
ternet as they are in the off-line world.
94. Id. at *8.
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